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Calling Foul: Deficiencies in
Approaches to Environmental
Whistleblowers and Suggested Reforms
Emily Becker*
Abstract
Whistleblowers could facilitate the regulation of the
environmental sector at little to no cost to the taxpayer. Often,
potential whistleblowers have timely access to information that
would enable them to avert or minimize environmental damage
and to protect our communities. However, existing federal and
state regulations fail to adequately protect environmental
whistleblowers and to incentivize potential environmental
whistleblowers. These failures unjustly penalize whistleblowers
and discourage potential whistleblowers. This article uses
research findings and a case study to illuminate these failings
and to argue for reforms that would better protect and incentivize
whistleblowers.
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I. Introduction
The film Erin Brockovich tells the true story of a
whistleblower who “brought a town to its feet and a corporation
to its knees” by fighting against the Pacific Gas and Electric
Company—and winning.1 In the final scene, Brockovich struts
into her brand new office, and her boss hands her a bonus check
for $2 million dollars.2 The audience leaves the film with the
sense that the hero did the right thing and got rewarded for it.
Though an inspiring tale, this film plays into the myth that if a
whistleblower has "the goods on the folks that are doing wrong”
then he or she “almost always succeeds.”3 In reality, the typical
whistleblower is “brutalized the entire way.”4 One study of
whistleblowers found that after blowing the whistle: “82% [of
whistleblowers] experienced harassment, 60% were fired, 17%
*
J.D.
cum
laude,
Harvard
Law
School
(ebecker@jd14.law.harvard.edu). I am grateful to Fardin Oliaei for sharing her
experience and insights on this topic and to Richard Lazarus and Caleb Griffin
for their support during the research and drafting process.
1.
A.O. Scott, Erin Brockovich: High Ideals, Higher Heels, N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/movie/review?res=9805eed8163af934a25750c0a9669c8
b63 (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT).
2.
ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Pictures 2000).
3.
Eugene Russo, The Plight of the Environmental Whistleblower,
THE
SCIENTIST
ONLINE
(Jan.
17,
2005),
http://www.thescientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/16170/title/The-Plight-of-theWhistleblower (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
4.
Id.
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lost their homes, and 10% admitted to [having] attempted
suicide”—a far cry from a swank office and a big check.5
This paper analyzes existing legal approaches to
environmental whistleblowers and concludes that existing laws
do not adequately protect whistleblowers and do not provide
sufficient incentives for potential whistleblowers.6 Specifically,
the weaknesses in federal and state statutes addressing
environmental whistleblowing include: (1) relying on an antiretaliatory model rather than an incentives-based model and (2)
using an overly limited definition of whistleblowing that excludes
(a) whistleblowers who report violations of “scientific integrity”
and (b) whistleblowers who disclose to the media or to their
supervisors.7 The federal approach falls short by (3) providing an
overly short statute of limitations.8 Most state approaches fail by
(4) offering whistleblowers insufficient remedies, including (a) not
penalizing supervisors who engage in retaliatory practices and (b)
failing to protect whistleblowers from blacklisting and/or
employment instability following their disclosures.9
The purposes of this paper are to: (1) outline the benefits
of whistleblowing, (2) provide an example of a real-life
whistleblower, (3) examine the limitations of existing approaches
to protecting environmental whistleblowers, and (4) recommend
changes to these approaches. The scope of this paper is restricted
to the legal protections available to environmental whistleblowers
in the United States under federal and state statutory schemes.
The Part II defines whistleblowing, examines the contributions
made by whistleblowers, analyzes the current status of
5.
Gerard Sinzdak, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws:
Defending A More Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 1633, 1655 (2008).
6.
See infra notes 178–Error! Bookmark not defined. (stating
that the existing whistleblowing regulation scheme requires statutory changes
that would provide more persuasive incentives and stronger protections).
7.
See infra notes 130–166 (discussing the shortcomings of failing
to provide incentives to whistleblowers and also difficulties created by overly
narrow definitions of whistleblowing in both state and federal law).
8.
See infra notes 173–177 (stating that a longer statute of
limitations would provide whistleblowers more time to evaluate reporting
options and take opportunities to protect themselves).
9.
See infra notes 169–Error! Bookmark not defined.
(outlining the failure of state whistleblowing statutes to adequately deter
supervisors from punishing whistleblowers).
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whistleblowers, and explores the role of whistleblowers in the
environmental context.10 Part III describes the experiences of
environmental whistleblower Fardin Oliaei, former Senior
Research Scientist and Coordinator of the Emerging
Contaminants Program at the Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency (MPCA).11 Part IV reviews existing laws applicable to
environmental whistleblowers and suggests changes to those
laws.12

II. Whistleblowing and Environmental Disputes
Who keeps Americans safe from corporate and industrial
wrongdoing? Is it government agencies charged with protecting
the public? Is it auditors responsible for monitoring industries? Is
it media personnel hunting for a good story? Is it insiders who
risk their jobs to protect the public? While all of these entities
play a role in detecting wrongdoing, recent research suggests that
nontraditional actors like the media and industry employees play
a greater role than government regulators.13 This section sheds
light on what a whistleblower is and how whistleblowers help
keep the public safe. 14 It begins by defining whistleblowers.15 It
then explores the main types of whistleblowers and their
motivations.16 Next, it examines the importance of whistleblowers
within the United States.17 The fourth subsection analyzes the
10.
See infra Part II (describing whistleblowing in environmental
law and its benefits).
11.
See infra Part III (illustrating the difficulties presented to
whistleblowers by analyzing Fardin Oliaei’s experiences in this role).
12.
See infra Part IV (suggesting reforms to federal and various
state laws that would improve reporting and enforcement).
13.
See I.J. Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who
Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2226 (2010) (identifying
the media as a key player in corporate governance by exposing improper
activities).
14.
See infra Part II (stating the benefits created by
whistleblowing, such as increased industry accountability).
15.
See infra Part II(A) (providing a standard definition of
whistleblowing).
16.
See infra Part II(B) (analyzing the various actors who typically
act as whistleblowers, such as auditors and journalists).
17.
See infra Part II(C) (describing the benefits created by
whistleblowing in the United States).
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consequences of whistleblowing for an individual whistleblower.
The final subsection explores the unique challenges faced by
environmental whistleblowers.18

A. Defining Whistleblowing
The term “whistleblower” finds its roots in an old practice
of the English police officers, who would blow a whistle to alert
other officers and the public that a crime was being committed
nearby. 19 The term has evolved and today generally refers to a
member of an organization who takes steps to inform others of
ethical or legal violations that are being or have been committed
by or within that organization.20 There is no consensus on the
precise definition of a whistleblower, with sources disagreeing
over: (1) what type of “wrong” (from improprieties to immoral
conduct to concrete violations of law) may be reported by a
whistleblower; (2) whether a whistleblower must act in good
faith; and (3) whether a whistleblower ought to report misconduct
to a supervisor, a government agency, the media or some
combination of these outlets. 21 In this paper, the term
“whistleblower” refers to an individual who reports actual or
potential misconduct (inclusive of violations of “scientific
integrity”) within a government agency or company that poses a
real or potential threat to the public interest.22 Part IV(3)
examines the benefits of incorporating a more expansive
18.
See infra Part II(D) (listing the many dangers deterring
potential whistleblowers, such as employment retaliation and blacklisting).
19.
See Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727
(Tex. 1990) (noting that “[t]he term is derived from the act of an English bobby
blowing his whistle upon becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert
other law enforcement officers and the public within the zone of danger”).
20.
See Peter D. Banick, Case Note: The "In-House" Whistleblower:
Walking the Line Between “Good Cop, Bad Cop”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1868,
1873 (2011) (stating that whistleblowers are “employees who . . . with a
reasonable belief that their assertions are accurate, report, disclose, or
otherwise make known to parties internal or external to the organization any
violation of law by their employers . . . for the purpose of exposing such
wrongdoing”).
21.
See id. at 1872–73 nn.20–21, 23 (outlining various areas of
disagreement over the definition of “whistleblowing”).
22.
See infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (incorporating
violations of “scientific integrity” into the definition of whistleblowing)
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definition of whistleblowing into existing laws.23

B. Who Detects Wrongdoing?
Many people assume that auditors and regulators are paid
to detect fraud in most instances.24 However, a recent study
found that nontraditional whistleblowers actually detected more
fraud than these traditional actors.25 Whistleblowers, including
employees of organizations committing fraud and media
personnel, exposed 30% of the fraud cases studied.26 Auditors, on
the other hand, detected only 10% of fraud cases, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) detected just 7% of
fraud cases. 27 The numbers are even starker in the healthcare
industry, with whistleblowers responsible for detecting 41% of
fraud cases in that sector.28 These figures underscore the
important role that whistleblowers play in protecting the public.
Though the extent of whistleblowers’ contribution to fraud
detection is initially surprising, a deeper analysis of incentives
and differential access to information helps explain why so many
employees and members of the media become whistleblowers. 29
The first group—employees of organizations engaging in
wrongdoing—has easy, low-cost access to information as a
natural byproduct of working inside the organization.30 Many
23.
See infra Part IV(B) (describing the benefits of expanding the
definition of whistleblowing so that many different actors are protected).
24.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding
Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 323 (2007) (noting that “a growing
body of literature addresses paying rewards to effective capital market
gatekeepers”).
25.
See Dyck et al., supra note 13, at 2224–26 (concluding that a
substantial amount of whistleblowing is conducted by actors that did not
traditionally embody reporting roles).
26.
See id. at 2214 (finding that media personnel account for 13%
of reporting and employees account for 17%).
27.
See id. (stating that individuals in primarily financial and
legal roles do not engage in a substantial amount of total reporting).
28.
See id. at 2215 (finding that 41% of reported frauds in the
health care industry are exposed by employees).
29.
See id. at 2214–15 (noting that traditional discussions of
whistleblowing “ignore differences in the costs of identifying and gathering
fraud-relevant information”).
30.
See id at 2214 (explaining that “[e]mployees, industry
regulators, and analysts gather a lot of relevant information as a byproduct of

CALLING FOUL

71

employees also blow the whistle in order to avoid personal
liability for fraud being committed within their organization.31
Positive monetary incentives, such as those offered by qui tam
suits that give whistleblowers a portion of the proceeds of fraud
detection, also motivate employees to become whistleblowers.32 In
fact, positive monetary incentives substantially increase the
likelihood that an individual employee will blow the whistle on
his or her employer. 33 Unfortunately, financial incentives exist in
a limited number of sectors, including the healthcare sector
where whistleblowers detect 41% of fraud cases, but largely
excluding the environmental sector.34 Part IV(B)(1) examines the
benefits of providing monetary incentives to encourage potential
whistleblowers in the environmental sector to go public.35
The second group—media personnel—has a positive
reputational incentive to expose fraud because it makes a
compelling news story.36 Unlike the incentives for employees,
journalists’ reputational incentive increases as the size of the
fraud increases.37 Indeed, value-weighting the data on fraud
cases to reflect the amount of money involved increases the
distribution of the media’s role in fraud detection from 13% to
24%, but has no effect on the distribution of employee’s role in
fraud detection.38
their normal work”).
31.
See id. at 2216 (stating that “[f]or many employee
whistleblowers the more important benefit is avoiding the potential legal
liability that arises from being involved in the fraud”).
32.
See id. at 2214–16 (discussing the incentives created by giving
those who bring information a large percentage of the money recovered as a
result).
33.
See id. at 2215–16 (concluding that “[m]onetary incentives for
fraud revelation appear to play a role regardless of the severity of the fraud”).
34.
See id. (noting that “in health care (an industry where suits
are more likely to provide a financial reward for whistleblowers because
government’s procurements account for a significant percentage of revenues)
41% of frauds are brought to light by employees”).
35.
See infra Part IV(B)(1).
36.
See id. at 2214 (describing the reputational incentive behind
exposing fraud).
37.
See id. (explaining that “[a] journalist who uncovers a fraud
receives national attention, which increases his career opportunities”).
38.
See id. (finding that “[v]alue-weighting creates only one change
in the distribution: the media become much more important (24%), suggesting
they mainly get involved in the biggest cases”).
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Interestingly, both employees and media personnel report
a surprising percent of fraud cases despite having relatively low
financial incentives when compared to the resources spent on
official monitors like auditors and regulators. 39 This suggests that
increasing incentives for employees and media personnel might
be more cost-effective than increasing spending on official

monitors.40
C. Importance of Whistleblowers
Employees and media personnel that blow the whistle
help identify wrongdoing that might never be detected by
auditors or regulators.41 Even in cases where the wrongdoing
would eventually become known, whistleblowers often help
identify the misconduct early. 42 By doing so, they reduce the cost
of subsequent investigations and ensure that the fraud has a
smaller impact than it would have had otherwise.43 Moreover, the
very presence of potential whistleblowers in a workplace likely
deters misconduct from ever occurring. 44
Whistleblower’s contributions are not only descriptively
good; they are also quantifiably valuable. As of 2007, “60 percent
of the Department of Justice's cases of fraud against the federal
government were initiated by whistleblowers, resulting in
recovery of over $20 billion for the taxpayers.”45 Whistleblower
39.
See id. (stating that “actors, who do not own any residual claim
in the firms involved and are often not considered important players in the
corporate governance arena, play a key role in fraud detection”).
40.
See id. at 2251 (concluding that monetary rewards should be
increased in order to incentivize whistleblowing from individuals who can easily
access and divulge information).
41
See Dolan v. Cont'l Airlines, 563 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Mich. 1997)
(noting that “[w]ithout employees who are willing to risk adverse employment
consequences as a result of whistleblowing activities, the public would remain
unaware of large-scale and potentially dangerous abuses”).
42.
See Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1635 (observing that employees
“can alert employers to problems before those problems escalate”).
43.
See id. at 1636 (finding that “information provided by
whistleblowers can substantially reduce the cost to the public of detection and
investigation of wrongdoing or corruption”).
44.
See id. at 1635–36 (observing that “[t]he presence of
whistleblowers may also help deter misconduct in the first instance”).
45.
Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections:
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claims against the pharmaceutical industry recovered $12 billion
from 2001 to 2011.46

D. Status of Whistleblowers
Despite the importance of contributions made by
whistleblowers, whistleblowers often suffer severe consequences
for their actions. 47 The study cited in the beginning of this
Article—finding that 82% of whistleblowers experienced
harassment, 60% were fired, 17% lost their homes, and 10%
admitted to attempted suicides—is not alone in highlighting the
negative consequences whistleblowers face.48 Other negative
consequences include being blacklisted from future employers,
facing social ostracism from coworkers, and experiencing
psychological strain.49 Many whistleblowers report that, “[i]f I
had to do it over again, I wouldn’t.”50 Perhaps it is not surprising
that whistleblowers are rare, representing less than two percent
of all employees.51 It is likely that many people do not even
consider blowing the whistle because of fear of reprisals. 52 The
Critiquing Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing
Pieces to Form A Beautiful Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 53 (2011).
46.
See id. (identifying the large amounts of money available to
whistleblowers via high-profile qui tam claims).
47.
See Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1655 (stating that “employees
cannot necessarily assume that their employer is ready and willing to solve
problems brought to its attention”).
48.
See id. (citing the large number of whistleblowers who are
negatively affected by reporting fraud).
49.
See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection:
Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 95–96 (2007) (describing the breadth of
negative consequences that whistleblowers face after reporting).
50.
Dyck, supra note 13, at 2216.
51.
See Laura Simoff, Comment, Confusion and Deterrence: The
Problems That Arise from A Deficiency in Uniform Laws and Procedures for
Environmental "Whistleblowers", 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 325, 327 (1999).
52.
See Mary Rowe & Corinne Bendersky, Workplace Justice, Zero
Tolerance and Zero Barriers, in NEGOTIATIONS AND CHANGE, FROM THE
WORKPLACE TO SOCIETY (Thomas Kochan and Richard Locke eds., 2002),
available at http://ombud.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/zero_zero.pdf
(explaining that “the organizational culture, if it is hierarchical and oriented
toward punishment, may, ironically, inhibit willingness to act or to come
forward”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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backlash faced by whistleblowers suggests that existing
protections under the law are insufficient,53 that our legal regime
offers insufficient incentives for potential whistleblowers, or a
combination of both. 54

E. Environmental Whistleblowers
Though regulating any industry is difficult, regulating the
environmental
industry
poses
unique
challenges. 55
Whistleblowers are important in all sectors, but whistleblowers
play a crucial role in the environmental sector.56 Though all
whistleblowers face obstacles, there is a particular subset of
challenges that many whistleblowers in the environmental sector
must face.57 This subsection explains: (1) the challenges of
regulating the environmental sector,58 (2) the potential for
53.
See OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, OSHA FACT SHEET: YOUR RIGHTS AS A WHISTLEBLOWER (2013), available
at https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/whistleblower_rights.pdf
(providing that an employee can file a complaint with OSHA if an employer
retaliates against the employee for whistleblowing while working in certain
“protected activities”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
54.
See OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM
(2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2013.pdf (explaining that it
can be inferred that the relatively small growth in the number of whistleblowers
reported indicates that the Act has not provided a significant incentive to report
misconduct) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY,
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
55.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY INFORMATION BY
SECTOR (2014) (“Most business sectors are affected by a number of major
environmental statutes and regulations.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
56.
See Theo Emery, With Tips From Whistle-Blowers, More
Hands on Deck in Pollution Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2012, at A11, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/13/us/whistle-blowers-help-us-fight-oceandumping.html?_r=0 (explaining that without whistleblowers it would be nearly
impossible to stop pollution dumpers) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
57.
See id. (explaining that the working environment on ships does
not allow for a worker to turn in their employer without some kind of safety
net).
58.
See infra Part II(E)(1).
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whistleblowers to increase compliance with environmental
regulations,59 and (3) the unique difficulties environmental
whistleblowers face.60

1. Challenges of Regulating the Environmental Sector
The environmental sector is difficult to regulate because:
(1) environmental dangers can be hard to monitor;61 (2)
enforcement of environmental regulations tends to be costly and
is often dependent upon industry self-reporting;62 (3) regulated
entities often have a financial incentive not to comply with
environmental laws;63 and (4) environmental harm is timesensitive and difficult to reverse.64
Part of this difficulty enforcing environmental regulations
comes from the very nature of environmental harms, which tend
to be hard to detect and trace back to their source. 65 Another
challenge comes from the fact that emission levels may vary over
space and time.66 A further challenge comes from the fact that
many small polluters that are individually difficult to monitor
can collectively pose a very real threat.67 These difficulties make
59.
60.
61.

See infra Part II(E)(2).
See infra Part II(E)(3).
See NAT’L CENTER FOR ENVTL. ECON, U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, ch. 4 at 16 (2014) (hereinafter
“PREPARING ECON. ANALYSES”) (explaining that the identification of a solution to
different environmental problems depends on how difficult the source of the
problem is to pinpoint) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
62.
See id. at 2 (“All efficient policies are cost-effective, but it is not
necessarily true that all cost-effective policies are efficient.”)
63.
See Jonathan S. Shefftz, EPA’s Economic Benefit Analysis
Policy and Practice, 19 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 74, 74 (2004) (illustrating that there
are “financial incentives” for the facility to avoid compliance).
64.
See PREPARING ECON. ANALYSES supra note 61, ch. 4 at 2 (2014)
(describing that pollution levels can vary over time and the resulting damages
can vary by location).
65.
See id. at 15 (explaining that identifying a solution to different
environmental problems depends on how difficult the source of the problem is to
pinpoint).
66.
See id. at 16 (indicating that one question to ask when
assessing the solution to an environmental problem is whether the pollutant
varies across time and space).
67.
See E. Somanathan & Thomas Sterner, Environmental Policy
Instruments and Institutions in Developing Countries, in ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL STABILITY: NEW POLICY OPTIONS 238 (Ramón
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environmental controls highly technical, posing another
challenge: Regulators must have expertise and access to hightech tools to establish effective pollution regulation controls based
on the type of pollutant. 68
Because of the challenges of enforcing environmental
regulations, government-regulated monitoring efforts are
expensive.69 In an effort to reduce the cost of enforcement, some
regulatory approaches, such as subsidies, deposit-refunded
systems, and information disclosure, shift the burden of proof
onto the regulated industry.70 Though less costly, these
approaches make regulators dependent on industry self-reporting
and create the potential for an industry to misreport its pollutant
levels.71 The potential that self-reported data will be misreported
or that industries will subvert official monitoring by engaging in
illegal practices, such as tampering with monitoring equipment
or dumping illegally, poses a serious threat because industries
often profit from noncompliance. 72 Under the theory of efficient
breach, companies may be willing to break environmental laws
López & Michael A. Toman eds., 2006) (summarizing the problems posed by
small polluters by explaining that “[i]t is the nature of such polluters that they
are hard to regulate by several of the conventional instruments used for bigger
industries”).
68.
See Robert W. Crandall, Pollution Controls, THE CONCISE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (Library of Economics and Liberty ed. 2008),
available
at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PollutionControls.html
(“Because each pollutant has many sources, the EPA often sets literally
hundreds of maximum-discharge standards for any single pollutant.”) (on file
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
69.
See THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 207
(Anthony Heyes ed. 2001) (explaining “government enforcement policy that
requires a significant amount of monitoring expenditures” is the most practical
option to regulate pollution, despite suggestions “to reduce the need for
expensive government monitoring”).
70.
See id. at 208 (outlining alternative innovations to reduce the
cost of government monitoring and the financial effects they may present).
71.
See id. at 207 (“One innovation is to require firms to self-report
any violation of pollution standards. Voluntary reporting is rewarded with more
lenient treatment.”).
72.
See John Livernois & C. J. McKenna, Truth or Consequences:
Enforcing Pollution Standards with Self-Reporting, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 415, 415
(1998) (“Theory suggests that firms comply with pollution laws when the cost of
compliance is less than the expected penalty for noncompliance and not
otherwise.”).
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where noncompliance is less costly than compliance because
regulations go under-enforced.73
Not only are environmental harms hard to monitor, costly
to regulate, and susceptible to “efficient breach,” environmental
harms are also time-sensitive.74 Indeed, environmental harms
jeopardize public health, and the longer harms continue, the
greater health risk these harms pose.75 Moreover, it is usually far
easier to prevent an environmental harm than to clean up after
one; some environmental harms are effectively irreversible. 76
Thus, regulators often need to act quickly to be effective.

2. Whistleblowers Can Facilitate Regulation of the
Environmental Sector
Whistleblowers can help regulators overcome the
aforementioned challenges. First, whistleblowers that work as
employees of regulated industries have the technical skills and
knowledge that make them effective internal monitors. 77
Moreover, whistleblowers increase compliance with little or no
additional cost to the taxpayer because they are private citizens
rather than official monitors.78 By increasing “the likelihood that
73.
See id. (suggesting that firms comply with regulations only
when the resulting penalty for noncompliance will cost them more than
implementing the changes would).
74.
See United States v. State Dep’t of Transp., No. C05–5447RJB,
2012 WL 3814924, at *21 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 7, 2007) (concluding that “timesensitivity is the most important factor” in determining EPA classification).
75.
See Gerard Hoek et al., Long-Term Air Pollution Exposure and
Cardio-Respiratory Mortality: A Review, 12 ENVTL. HEALTH, no. 43, 2013, at 1
(“There is growing evidence of mortality effects related to long term
exposure . . . to ambient pollution.”).
76.
See PREPARING ECON. ANALYSES, supra note 61, at 4–19
(indicating that “[g]eneral pollution prevention efforts” are the second most
popular voluntary initiative, after “energy efficiency and climate change
programs”).
77.
See Hesch, supra note 45, at 53 (relaying the anecdote of
employee-whistleblowers who helped bring the Enron and WorldCom
misconduct to light and were lauded as heroes).
78.
See Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers:
Should Counterclaims Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed In False Claims
Act Cases?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 718 (1993) (citing whistleblowing as a qui
tam action and explaining that the term “means that the party bringing the
action is doing so for the government’s interest as well as his own private
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polluters will be penalized,” 79 whistleblowers can quell the
danger of efficient breach by helping to ensure that
noncompliance is more costly than compliance.80 Finally, internal
whistleblowers often learn of violations as they are happening
and can act quickly to contain or even prevent a time-sensitive
environmental harm.81 Likewise, whistleblowers in the media can
write a quick article that alerts community members of potential
threats before regulators have time to act.82 In these ways,
environmental whistleblowers have the potential to increase
compliance with environmental laws.

3. Challenges Faced by Environmental Whistleblowers
Despite the need for whistleblowers in the environmental
sector and the financial savings they can provide, several features
of the environmental sector make being an whistleblower
especially challenging. 83 One problem is that most definitions of
who is considered a “whistleblower” cover only individuals who
report on traditional types of misconduct, such as waste, fraud,
abuse of authority, and actions that pose an imminent threat to
public health and safety.84 However, potential environmental
interest”).
79.
Cody McBride, Making Pollution Inefficient Through
Empowerment, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 405, 428 (2012).
80.
See id. (explaining that increasing the chance that polluting
facilities will be fined or otherwise penalized eliminates the attractiveness of
efficient breach).
81.
See Strader, supra note 78, at 718 (“Employees of a company or
organization usually have the best access to information about wrongdoing, and
consequently know more than the best-conceived government inspection
system.”).
82.
See Sheila Coronel, Leaks, Whistleblowers, and the Media’s
Right to Report, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM NETWORK (Aug. 15, 2014),
http://gijn.org/2014/08/15/leaks-whistleblowers-and-the-medias-right-to-report/
(describing the story of a reporter who blew the whistle on misconduct in an
SEC executive session through media stories and spurred the government to
launch an investigation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
83.
See Strader, supra note 78, at 718 (“Whistleblowers have the
potential to save the federal government billions of dollars, help preserve the
environment, and protect the health and safety of the public.”) (emphasis
added).
84.
See e.g., Hesch, supra note 45, at 64 (indicating that the
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whistleblowers often encounter wrongdoing not covered by
protective statutes, such as the suppression of results of
emissions analyses and the use of skewed methodologies or
inferior data.85 Relatedly, because scientific findings can be
uncertain
and
contentious,
potential
environmental
whistleblowers may be unclear as to whether they can or should
publish controversial work in journals or newspapers.86
Second, the environmental sector has what is known as a
“revolving door” problem, a phrase that describes how individuals
often work both as regulators and as employees of regulated
industries during their career. 87 Though there is a benefit to
having experience in both sectors, often “revolving-door officials
develop or direct policies that benefit a former or prospective
employer.”88 Even those that do not actively attempt to benefit an
employer may be unduly cautious in what they are willing to say
or do because they are concerned about their job prospects.89
Third, while whistleblowers in other industries may be
able to stop wrongdoing by reporting internally, it is much more
difficult for environmental whistleblowers to rely on internal
Whistleblower Protection Act protects approximately 2.5 million federal
workers, but excludes “the Postal Service, Postal Rate Commission, Government
Accountability Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency”).
85.
See id. at 64–65 (explaining that whistleblowers may be
deterred from reporting misconduct when reporting the particular misconduct in
question is not expressly protected by statute).
86.
See Scientific Integrity: Let Science Do Its Job, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, (Mar. 2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity
(reporting that there are often varying interests at play that can determine
whether a piece should be published) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
87.
See Michael Halpern and Peter Hansel, Heads They Win, Tails
We Lose: How Corporations Corrupt Science at the Public’s Expense, UNION OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS,
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/catalyst/su12-heads-they-win-tails-welose.html#.VFxfd4fnmGk (highlighting a study that revealed the way
“companies change their messages depending on the audience and underscore[d]
the need to hold companies accountable to investors, policy makers, and the
public”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
88.
Id. at 3.
89.
See Interview with Fardin Oliaei, Former Senior Research
Scientist and Coordinator of the Emerging Contaminants Program at the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA), in Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 20,
2012) (recounting her experience as an environmental whistleblower).
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reporting alone. This is because unlike other types of wrongdoing,
environmental wrongdoing often has adverse effects on third
parties and often creates lingering harms. 90 Thus, environmental
whistleblowers that report internally may inadvertently enable
their employers to avoid compensating third-party victims or to
avoid paying the costs of environmental cleanup.91 To ensure
that the situation is fully remedied, environmental
whistleblowers therefore often need to report externally or
otherwise publicize the wrongdoing.92
Finally, because so many people encounter chemicals and
pollutants at different stages, environmental whistleblowers
come from many different backgrounds.93 They can be employees
involved with cleanup of environmental hazards, individuals
responsible for storing and disposing of solvents, factory workers,
concerned scientists, regulators who feel their work is being
silenced, media personnel who learn about contamination from a
variety of sources, and others.94 In fact, whistleblower protections
from environmental laws have been applied to: “a painter who
cooperated with an investigation into toxic dumping, a teacher
who complained about asbestos in a school house, an engineer
who filed reports regarding a shipyard’s noncompliance with
hazardous waste regulations, and an employee who told a
newspaper reporter about the discharge of sludge into the Cedar
Rapids.”95 With environmental whistleblowers found in many
different sectors, it is difficult to ensure that potential
whistleblowers know about applicable laws, including the
protections available, the procedure for reporting, and the
timeline for the relevant statute of limitations.96
90.
See Sinzdak, supra at note 5, 1651 (highlighting the potential
long term problems).
91.
See id. at 1652 (noting the residual effects of internal
reporting).
92.
See id. at 1661 (suggesting a solution to an internal reporting
problem).
93.
See
Richard
E.
Condit,
Providing
Environmental
Whistleblowers with Twenty-First Century Protections, 2 AM. U. LAB. & EMP. L.F.
31, 33 (2011) (describing the types of people who typically file whistleblowing
reports).
94.
See id. (providing examples of whistleblowers).
95.
William Sanjour and Stephen M. Kohn, Environmental
Whistleblowers: An Endangered Species, ENVTL. RESEARCH FOUND. (Feb. 1994).
96.
See Condit, supra note 93 (highlighting problems that
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III. Fardin Oliaei: A Case Study in Environmental
Whistleblower Laws
In 2000, Fardin Oliaei was working as a Senior Research
Scientist and Coordinator of the Emerging Contaminants
Program at the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA). 97
Her job was to investigate the dangers posed by emerging
contaminants (a term for any artificial or naturally-occurring
chemical that is not typically monitored but has the potential to
enter the environment and pose a danger to the environment or
human health).98 Oliaei was one of the first scientists in the state
to express concern about the environmental and health risks
posed by perfluorinated chemicals (PFCs), “a family of synthetic
compounds that 3M manufactured for use in waterproofing
agents, non-stick cookware, fire-fighting foam, and food
packaging.”99 She found that PFC contamination had spread
throughout the state, with the chemicals turning up everywhere
from fish in Voyageur’s National park to drinking water in
communities near 3M waste disposal sites.100
Human exposure to PFCs has been linked with cancer,
thyroid problems, and liver damage, but the link is not
necessarily causal.101 Though the long-term effects of exposure to
PFCs on human health are uncertain, scientists worry because
PFCs “accumulate in living tissue and take a long time to break
down.”102 A former 3M chemist described one common form of
PFC, perfluorooctane sulfonate or PFOS, as one of the “most
insidious pollutants” of recent times in part because it does not
degrade, is highly toxic to wildlife, and its environmental sink

whistleblowers encounter).
97.
See Interview with Fardin Oliaei, supra note 89 (detailing
Oliaei’s position).
98.
See id. (explaining what Oliaei’s research entailed).
99.
Mike Mosedale, PCA Whistleblower in Minnesota Paid a Steep
Price, SAINT PAUL LEGAL LEDGER CAPITOL REPORT, July 14, 2010.
100.
See id. (detailing the results of Oliaei’s research).
101.
See Christopher Lau et al., Perfluoroalkyl Acids: A Review of
Monitoring and Toxicological Findings, 99 TOXICOLOGICAL SCIENCES 366–94,
(2007) (explaining the health risks of perfluoroalkyl acids in the environment).
102.
Mosedale, supra note 99.
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appears to be biota rather than soil or sediment.103 Because of the
extent of the contamination, the length of time it takes PFCs to
break down, and the scientific uncertainty regarding their health
effects, Oliaei considered PCFs to be a top priority for research. 104
Despite the scientific basis for concern, Oliaei alleges that
MPCA management deliberately deterred her from continuing to
research the chemicals.105 In her words, “since Ms. [Sheryl]
Corrigan left 3M to become MPCA Commissioner . . . MPCA top
management . . . intentionally minimized the environmental
monitoring of PFCs in Minnesota.”106 When Oliaei publicized her
findings on Minnesota Public Radio, top management disciplined
her and threatened to fire her if she continued to speak out about
the issue.107 She explains that the pressure to be silent was so
great that “PFC was a forbidden word. During my last three
years at the agency, the managers told me, ‘Fardin, don’t mention
PFC or you will lose your job.’”108
Ultimately, Oliaei resigned from MPCA and pursued a
lawsuit citing violations of the First Amendment, federal civil
rights statutes, and the Minnesota Human Rights and
Whistleblower Acts. 109 After her resignation, Oliaei received a
settlement of $325,000 (or three years of her salary), but that
money quickly dwindled. 110 As of 2012, she has been unable to
find employment in her field, with several interviewers informing
her that they had been pressured into not hiring her.111 Though
Oliaei has been “constantly applying for jobs,” she now believes
she was “naively optimistic” and that she has “been blacklisted
from any possible job. 112 She reports that one potential employer
103.
See Fardin Oliaei, Fardin Oliaei Explains Why She Resigned,
MINNESOTA
PUBLIC
RADIO
(Feb.
2,
2006),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2006/02/05_sommerm_fardinslet
ter/ (providing reasons for why Oliaei spoke out about PFCs) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVRIONMENT).
104.
See id. (explaining why PCFs were important to Oliaei).
105.
See id. (detailing the reaction she got to her research).
106.
Id.
107.
See Mosedale, supra note 99 (explaining the pressure she felt
at work).
108.
Id.
109.
See id. (detailing Oliaei’s claims).
110.
See id. (explaining her current financial status).
111.
See id. (hypothesizing why she can’t find work).
112.
Id.
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explained that they could not hire her because, “3M is a powerful
company. They drew lines and you crossed them. Now you can
never step back inside.”113 This employer encouraged Oliaei to
leave the state to increase her chances of finding a job. 114
Eventually, she was forced to sell her prized possession—her
home.115 “I hate to say it, but this is the reality: I’m homeless,”
said Oliaei, who now lives with a friend out of state.116 “I lost
everything. I left the agency with my 49 boxes of PFC research.
When I sold the house, I let everything go at an estate sale for
almost nothing—except for those boxes. I took those with me.”117
Since her resignation, politicians, regulators, and
scientists have become more aware of the dangers posed by PFCs
and efforts have been made to clean up the contamination.118
Many insiders attribute these changes to Oliaei’s work. State
Senator John Marty, DFL-Roseville, said Oliaei’s efforts “made a
big difference . . . [because] ‘I don’t think anyone was paying
attention to PFCs before her.’”119 State Rep. Karen Clark, DFLMinneapolis, furthered, “[e]verything Fardin said when she
testified to the Senate has proven to be true. It just took a couple
of years to come out . . . I do think Fardin did us all a tremendous
public service and she paid dearly.”120 Though Oliaei was not
recognized for her work while at MPCA, her contributions have
since been recognized.121 Rather than being disciplined, her
supervisors, Paul Hoff and Marvin Hora, received recognition for
Oliaei’s comprehensive research on PFC and were promoted.122
113.
114.

Id.
See Complaint at 10–11, Fardin Oliaei v. Minnesota Pollution
Control
Agency,
available
at
http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/mn/05_16_5_complaint.pdf.
115.
See Mosedale, supra note 99 (detailing the consequences of her
resignation).
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
See id. (providing new developments between researchers and
the company to monitor the PFCs).
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
See id. (saying that politicians have since praised her work and
her contributions).
122.
See MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Toxic Traces, (2005),
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/projects/2005/02/toxictraces/ (saying that
Oliaei’s supervisors were later allowed to work on her PFC research project that
she had recommended before she was fired) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
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Oliaei’s experiences echo some of the obstacles facing
environmental whistleblowers as discussed in Part II(E).
Specifically, (1) the misconduct Oliaei made public constituted a
violation of scientific integrity, involving the suppression of her
research and an attempt to silence her; (2) part of the conflict
between Oliaei and MPCA management involved a disagreement
over her rights to publicize her research; (3) her supervisor,
Commissioner Corrigan, previously worked for 3M (a producer of
PFCs) and as such exemplifies the “revolving door” problem; and
(4) the pollution involved impacts third parties and takes a long
time to breakdown, meaning that simply preventing further
contamination would not completely resolve the problem. Her
experiences also highlight some of the challenges whistleblowers
face after going public, including losing their jobs, losing their
homes, having difficulty finding other work in the industry, and
seeing those who suppressed their research go unpunished.

IV. Analysis of Environmental Whistleblower Laws: Current
Status, Limitations, and Suggested Reforms
Though Fardin Oliaei’s story does not have a happy
ending, there is hope that things can and will change. President
Obama signed into law the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), after it received the vote of
every single member of the 112th Congress.123 Though this law
only applies to federal employees and does not change the legal
protections offered to most environmental whistleblowers, it
significantly expands protections for the workers it does cover. 124
After the bill passed the House, Tom Devine, legal counsel for the
Government Accountability Project, stated that the whistleblower
rights in this bill are the strongest in history for federal
workers.125 The unanimous passage of the law suggests that
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
123.
See Dylan Blaylock, President Signs Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act (WPEA), GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 27 November 2012
(describing the level of support the WPEA had in Congress).
124.
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-199, § 110, 126 Stat. 1465 (eliminating certain less-permissive
alternatives for whistleblowers and instructing employers to tell their
employees about their rights under the Act).
125.
See Blaylock, supra note 123 (explaining how strengthened
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American lawmakers value whistleblowers and are willing to
take steps to ensure that they are protected. Rep. Darrell Issa (RCalif.) supported passage of the WPEA and he hoped that it “sent
a clear message to those who help us protect the American people
and their hard-earned tax dollars: [w]e stand beside you.”126
Hopefully, lawmakers will send a similar message to
environmental whistleblowers by expanding protections available
to them.
This Part analyzes the legal approaches to protecting
environmental whistleblowers. It begins by providing an overview
of the existing laws protecting environmental whistleblowers127.
It then considers deficiencies in these laws and suggests ways to
reform them.128 Where applicable, the section identifies portions
of the WPEA and other laws that make reforms similar to those
proposed here to demonstrate that the suggest reforms are both
preceded and feasible.

A. Overview
There are three main sources of law protecting
environmental whistleblowers: federal environmental statutes
providing for judicial relief, state whistleblower statutes, and
state-level tort law.129 Because there often are applicable state or
federal statutes and because the existence of a statutory remedy
often precludes a common law cause of action for wrongful
discharge, this paper focuses on the former two forms of
protection.

1. Federal Statutes
From 1972 to 1980, Congress amended six environmental
protection laws to include protections for environmental
whistleblower rights were by the Act).
126.
See id. (showing that legislators support the WPEA’s aims).
127.
See infra Part IV(A) (providing a history of whistleblower laws
prior to the WPEA).
128.
See infra Part IV(B) (outlining current problems and potential
solutions to whistleblower protections).
129.
See Simoff, supra note 51, at 327 (explaining different laws
governing whistleblower claims).
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whistleblowers.130 These six statutes include: the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”), 131 the Safe Drinking Water Act
(“SDWA”),132 the Toxic Substance Control Act (“TSCA”),133 the
Solid Waste Disposal Act (“SWDA”),134 the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”),135 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).136 These statutes
seek to protect whistleblowers from employers who retaliate
against them for speaking out against a potential violation. 137
Federal whistleblowing laws provide protections that are
generally more favorable to the employee when compared to state
whistleblower protections.138 These statutes have a very short
statute of limitations that require whistleblowers to file
violations with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) within thirty
days.139
Under the six federal statutes, the whistleblower must
establish three elements of the prima facie case: (1) that their
employer is covered by the act; (2) that the employee has engaged
in protected activity under one of the acts; and (3) that the
employee’s terms and conditions of employment have suffered as
a consequence of engaging in the protected activity, with a
showing of a discriminatory motive by a preponderance of the
evidence.140 The employer can rebut a showing of discriminatory
motive by giving legitimate business reasons for allegedly

130.
See Hesch, supra note 45, at 82 (outlining the statutes that
include whistleblower protections).
131.
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (2014).
132.
42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. (2014).
133.
15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2014).
134.
42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq. (2014).
135.
42 U.S.C. §7401 et seq. (2014).
136.
42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. (2014).
137.
See Hesch, supra note 93, at 82 (explaining the rationale for
enacting these statutes).
138.
See Michael A. Zody, Responding to Environmental
Whistleblowers: Listen Carefully to that Sound Coming ‘Round the Bend, 51
ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL L. INST. § 6.02[1] (2005) (outlining the importance of
federal whistleblower legislation and comparing federal whistleblower laws to
state laws).
139.
See Hesch, supra note 45, at 83 (describing the time given to
file whistleblower actions).
140.
See Simoff, supra note 51, at 330–31(outlining the elements
that the whistleblower must prove).
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retaliatory conduct.141 The employee then can demonstrate that
the discriminatory motive would not have occurred in absence of
whistleblowing activities.142
The six federal statutes are extremely inclusive; any
person in the private or public sector has the right to assert an
anti-retaliation claim. 143 Though broadly applicable to different
actors, they only protect whistleblowers from retaliation against
actions within the scope of the statute, such as filing formal
complaints or providing official testimony.144 Types of
discriminatory action covered by the statute include: termination,
demotion, unfavorable references, rescinding of duties, and
blacklisting of employees by the employer. 145 It is relatively
difficult to win one of these suits in court. An analysis of case
decisions of the U.S. Department of Labor's Office of
Administrative Law Judges shows that from 2000 through 2010
only seventeen of 127 decided environmental whistleblower cases
(slightly over thirteen percent) resulted in some type of relief for
the employee.146

2. State Statutes
Every state and the District of Columbia have enacted
some type of a whistleblower protection statute.147 However, state
whistleblower statutes vary widely. Some of the major areas of
difference include: the appropriate recipient of a whistleblower's
report, the nature of the “wrongdoing” covered by the statute, and
141.
See id. at 332 (providing an example of a way for an employer
to rebut a discrimination claim).
142.
See id. (stating that the whistleblower has the right of rebuttal
in these actions).
143.
See Hesch, supra note 45, at 83 (providing the types of people
who can bring a claim under the statutes).
144.
See id. at 83–84 (stating that the protections to whistleblowers
are not as broad as they seem).
145.
See id. at 85 (providing list of discriminatory behaviors banned
by the whistleblower statutes).
146.
See Condit, supra note 93, at 52 (showing the difficulty of
succeeding in a whistleblower case during this time period).
147.
See Rachel Goodson, The Adequacy of Whistleblower
Protection: Is the Cost to the Individual Whistleblower Too High?, 12 HOUS. BUS.
& TAX L. J. 161, 174 (2012) (claiming that every state has a whistleblower
protection act).

88

6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014)

the available remedies.148
Because of this variation, it is difficult to speak of state
whistleblower statutes as a whole. However, there are observable
trends in state approaches. First, the vast majority of states rely
exclusively on an anti-retaliation model to protect environmental
whistleblowers as opposed to an incentives-based approach that
would encourage whistleblowers to go public and to compensate
them for doing so.149 In fact, all state statutes offer some sort of
protection provision for employees who face employer retaliation
while few offer an incentives-based approach.150 Secondly, most
state statutes limit the definition of a whistleblower in similar
ways.151 Only thirteen states protect disclosures to “to any person
or organization, including public media,” and only two states
cover “communication of scientific opinion or alteration of
technical findings.”152 Thirdly, most state statutes have a
consistent approach to remedies with respect to the fact that no
states offer “transfer preference for prevailing whistleblower or
ban on blackballing” and only 14 state statutes provide for
“personnel actions against managers found to have retaliated.”153

B. Deficiencies in Existing Approaches and Suggested
Reforms
This section identifies deficiencies in existing laws
regarding environmental whistleblowers, and it suggests ways
that these laws could be reformed. Because many deficiencies
148.
See id. (providing the difference between state statutes).
149.
See generally NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
STATE
WHISTLEBLOWER
LAWS
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-whistleblowerlaws.aspx (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
150.
See Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1656-57 (outlining the difference
between protections offered to whistleblower employees).
151.
See Goodson, supra note 147, at 17374 (explaining the wide
variety of ways in which whistleblowers are protected by state laws).
152.
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, State
Whistleblower
Laws
–
Overview
(2011),
available
at
http://www.peer.org/assets/docs/wbp2/overview.pdf
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT).
153.
Id.

CALLING FOUL

89

exist in both federal and state approaches, the deficiencies are
divided by subject matter rather than by legal framework with an
indication whether a given deficiency applies to both or only to
one of the two statutory schemes.154

1. Failure to Use an Incentives-Based Approach (Federal
and State)
Though all six federal statutes and the majority of state
statutes rely on the anti-retaliation model, this approach does not
provide incentives to encourage potential whistleblowers to go
public.155 Research suggests that anti-retaliation statutes are far
less successful at encouraging whistleblowers to go public than
statutes that promise a financial reward.156 As mentioned above,
whistleblowers in the healthcare sector (which employs an
incentives based approach) report a greater percentage of fraud
cases than in other sectors. 157 Moreover, adding an incentives
component to existing approaches has been shown to increase the
size and number of reports filed. 158 For example, in 2006, the IRS
issued a bounty program, Section 7623(b), which provided that
whistleblowers would receive a 15–30% bounty of collected
revenues if the IRS successfully recovered revenues based upon
information brought to light by the whistleblower. 159 In just three
years, reporting increased by over 100%—jumping from 2,751
cases in 2007 to 5,678 cases in 2009.160 Moreover, while there
were no IRS collections over $2 million between 2003 and 2006,
there were fifteen collections over $2 million between 2007 and
154.
See generally Goodson, supra note 147 (describing the federal
and state statutes related to environmental whistleblowers).
155.
See id. at 17076 (explaining how federal and state statutes
utilize the anti-retaliation model).
156.
See id. at 166 (discussing how financial incentives have been
used effectively to encourage whistleblowing).
157.
See Dyck, supra note 13, at 221516 (emphasizing that
whistleblowing is more prevalent in the healthcare industry than elsewhere).
158.
See id. (suggesting that the addition of financial incentives to
whistleblower protection statutes results in increased reporting).
159.
See Patrick A. Barthle II, Whistling Rogues: A Comparative
Analysis of the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Bounty Program, 69 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1201, 121516 (2012) (explaining the IRS’s bounty revenue program).
160.
See Dyck, supra note 13 at 221516 (describing the success of
section 7623(b)).
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2009.161 These figures suggest that offering a financial reward to
environmental whistleblowers could dramatically increase the
amount of wrongdoing detected.162
The existing approach to environmental whistleblowers
should be reformed by providing environmental whistleblowers
whose reporting results in recovery of civil penalties or fines with
a portion of the proceeds. The framework for providing funding
for such an incentives program already exists. 163 In 2010, the
“EPA reported that it secured over $150 million in civil penalties
and criminal fines and restitution.”164 Lawmakers could modify
this system by offering a portion of the proceeds to whistleblowers
that report a violation that results in such penalties or fines. 165
Statistics from other sectors suggest that doing so would increase
the net recovery made by the EPA as well as the number of
claims filed.166
Critics of the incentives-based model point out that
financial incentives are not always possible in circumstances
where the employer is small or the type of infraction committed
does not net a substantial fine or civil penalty.167 Moreover,
financial awards are not always appropriate or feasible in
circumstances where whistleblowers identify violations of
scientific integrity like the suppression of research or the use of
inferior data.168 Thus, the incentives-based model would provide a
supplement to but not a replacement for the anti-retaliatory
model.169 A two-pronged approach would ensure that
161.
See id. (providing data on IRS collections under section
7623(b)).
162.
See id. (suggesting that financial incentives would increase
environmental whistleblowing).
163.
See Condit, supra note 93, at 55 (explaining that a financial
incentive program already exists under the Dodd-Frank Act).
164.
Id.
165.
See id. at 5556 (suggesting that there are alternatives for
encouraging whistleblowing).
166.
See id (opining that more instances of environmental
degradation might be detected if a financial incentive program was
implemented).
167.
See Goodson, supra note 147, at 190 (explaining the limitations
of financial incentive programs).
168.
See id. at 190–91 (indicating that financial incentives are not
always appropriate)
169.
See id. at 19293 (suggesting that a standardized approach to
whistleblower protection would be beneficial).
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whistleblowers in all circumstances are protected by the antiretaliatory model, but would provide incentives that would likely
increase the number of whistleblowers who report on a certain
class of infractions.

2. Overly Limited Definition of Whistleblower (Federal and
State)
The federal approach and the majority of state approaches
rely on an overly limited definition of whistleblowers. 170
Specifically, the definition of a “whistleblower” used does not
include those who blow the whistle by alerting news media or
those who post online.171 The definition also does not include
individuals that identify violations of the scientific method, such
as suppression of data, use of skewed methodologies or use of
inferior methods.172
The limited definition of a whistleblower poses particular
problems for environmental whistleblowers.173 First, as
mentioned in Part II(E)(3) of this paper, environmental
whistleblowers are spread throughout many sectors of the U.S.
economy.174 Unlike potential whistleblowers from other sectors
(like the federal government or the financial market), it is
logistically difficult to ensure that potential whistleblowers know
of the protections available to them.175 Second, the limited
definition keeps environmental whistleblowers from alerting the
media of the ongoing harm.176 Unlike time-consuming internal
reporting mechanisms or external administrative remedies,
170.
See generally Simoff, supra note 51 (describing how state and
federal statutes differ regarding protection for whistleblowers).
171.
See Russo, supra note 3 (noting that whistleblower protection
statutes do not include all types of reporting).
172.
See id. (explaining that whistleblower protection statutes do
not cover scientific integrity).
173.
See Hesch, supra note 45, at 82 (noting that whistleblower
protections vary in the environmental sector).
174.
See id. at 53 (describing the various industries to which
environmental whistleblower statutes relate).
175.
See id. at 83 (explaining how the statute of limitations makes
it difficult for employees to learn about the rights and balance the risks
associated with whistleblowing).
176.
See id. at 88 (indicating that the current statutes do not
protect public disclosures).

92

6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 1 (2014)

turning to the media is a quick way for whistleblowers to inform
a large number of third-party victims of the dangers posed by
environmental damage.177 Finally, the failure to protect
whistleblowers that identify violations of the scientific method
excludes an important type of misconduct that poses a real
danger to the public and ignores the reality facing whistleblowers
in the science sector. 178
The definition used should be reformed to include
whistleblowers who make disclosures to the media and/or online,
and whistleblowers who report violations of “scientific integrity.
“The former change would give whistleblowers easier access to a
wider audience and would protect those who speak to the media
without understanding the nuances of relevant laws.179 The latter
change would recognize the reality of the situation facing
environmentalists and scientists who often witness the
production of bad science that falls outside traditional
understandings of “misconduct.”
Expanding the definition of whistleblowing to include
reports to the media would not be unprecedented.180 Though
uncommon, there are federal statutes that protect whistleblowers
that make reports to the media, such as the Federal False Claims
Act and the whistleblower protections found in the Occupational
Health and Safety Act.181 The original federal Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989 went even further to permit federal
employees to report to any person at all.182 Similar provisions in
state and federal statutes for environmental whistleblowers
would ensure that more of these whistleblowers are protected
from discrimination and that they are more able to make news of
environmental wrongdoing available to the public. 183
177.
See id. (suggesting that protecting public disclosures would aid
potential whistleblowers).
178.
See Russo, supra note 3 (discussing the problems faced by
potential whistleblowers concerned with protecting scientific integrity).
179.
See Hesch, supra note 45 at 88 (recommending that
whistleblower protection statutes be expanded to include media disclosures).
180.
See Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1656 (noting that “federal law
does protect employees who blow the whistle to the media in some cases”).
181.
See id. at 165657 (stating that the Federal False Claims Act
“protects those who make an initial report to the media”).
182.
See id. (providing background on the practice of providing
protection for public disclosures).
183.
See id. at 165859 (explaining why providing whistleblower

CALLING FOUL

93

Likewise, there are statutes that specifically cover
situations faced by whistleblowing scientists. 184 For example, the
recently passed 2012 Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act
(“WPEA”) takes steps to protect government scientists from
scientific censorship.185 Section 110, “Disclosure of Censorship
Related to Research, Analysis, or Technical Information” defines
scientific censorship as, “any effort to distort, misrepresent or
suppress research, analysis or technical information” and
protects against such censorship when employees reasonably
believe that it may cause gross government waste or
mismanagement, that may pose a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety, or that constitutes violates the law. 186
By passing the WPEA in fall of 2012, Congress demonstrated
willingness to actively protect government scientists from
censorship and to recognize the unique challenges scientists face
when blowing the whistle. A similar reform to state and federal
statutes protecting environmental whistleblowers would ensure
that environmental scientists too are explicitly protected from
scientific censorship.

3. Insufficient Remedies (State)
The anti-retaliatory approach is intended to protect
whistleblowers that go public from retaliation by their
employers.187 However, current approaches to whistleblowing
legislation fail to protect whistleblowers from job loss or
blackballing and to penalize supervisors responsible for engaging
in retaliatory practices. 188 Given that 60% of whistleblowers lost
protection for media disclosures would be beneficial).
184.
See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub.
L. No. 112-199, § 110, 126 Stat 1465 (providing an example of protections for
scientists).
185.
See id. (describing how government scientists are afforded
whistleblower protection).
186.
Id.
187.
See OSHA FACT SHEET, supra note 53 (2013) (outlining worker
rights when an employer retaliates against the worker for whistleblowing).
188.
See Paul Sullivan, The Price Whistle-Blowers Pay for Secrets,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/22/your-money/forwhistle-blowers-consider-the-risks-wealth-matters.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(discussing the consequences whistleblowers are likely to face) (on file with the
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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their jobs after going public, employment security is a very real
issue for whistleblowers. 189 However, no state statute provides a
“transfer preference for prevailing whistleblowers or a ban on
blackballing.”190 Additionally, research shows that positive and
negative pressures regarding whistleblowing can shape behaviors
in the workplace.191 However, few states use negative incentives
to discourage supervisors from engaging in retaliatory practices
in the first place. 192
State anti-retaliatory statutes should be reformed to
provide transfer preference for a prevailing whistleblower and/or
a ban on blackballing. Additionally, these statutes could better
discourage supervisors from engaging in retaliatory practices by
providing penalties for managers found to have retaliated. 193
These changes would be especially valuable in the environmental
sector because they would help address the “revolving door”
problem that gives industry the power to influence regulators. 194
Indeed, by reducing potential environmental whistleblowers’
fears of employment instability, these changes would empower
public and private employees to speak out against wrongdoing. 195
By increasing potential retaliators’ fears of punishment and
potential job loss, these statutes would provide a counterbalance
to the power private interests hold by virtue of the “revolving
189.
Sinzdak, supra note 5, at 1655 (citing a 1992 study of
consequences faced by whistleblowers).
190.
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER),
supra note 87.
191.
See Goodson, supra note 130, at 191 (analyzing different
corporate policy approaches to whistleblower protections and their effects on
employees).
192.
See id. at 174 (considering the practical effects of current state
whistleblower policies).
193.
See id, at 173–74 (noting the high degree of difficulty
whistleblowers face when trying to avoid retaliation).
194.
See Halpern & Hansel, Heads They Win, Tails We Lose: How
Corporations Corrupt Science at the Public’s Expense, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, (Feb. 2012), http://www.ucsusa.org/publications/catalyst/su12heads-they-win-tails-we-lose.html#.VFxfd4fnmGk (Explaining the special
challenges scientific whistleblowers face) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
195.
See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Blowing the Whistle:
Barriers to Federal Employees Making Disclosures, 14 (2011) (discussing a study
on whistle blowing and fear of retaliation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).
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door.”196
These types of provisions exist in other laws. The prior
version of the WPEA, the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 197
both (1) granted job transfer preference to whistleblowers in
filling jobs of equivalent status and tenure as the job held by the
whistleblowing employee and (2) provided for disciplinary actions
against supervisors. The WPEA did not change the former
provision, but did strengthen the latter provision by lowering the
burden of proof. 198 Additionally, thirteen state statutes already
discipline supervisors in some way.199 State statutes ought to be
modified to better protect whistleblowers and penalize
retaliators.

4. Statute of Limitations Too Short (Federal)
The six federal statutes covering environmental
whistleblowers require whistleblowers to report to the
Department of Labor (“DOL”) within thirty days of the
violation.200 This statute of limitations does not give
whistleblowers enough time to weigh their options and take steps
to protect themselves.201 Environmental whistleblowers in
particular would benefit from an extended statute of
limitations.202 Potential environmental whistleblowers come from
all walks of life, and many may not be aware of the limited time
they have to file a complaint or of the procedure for doing so.
Other statutes have been amended to include a longer
196.
See Halpern and Hansel, supra note 194 (defining the
“revolving door” power struggle faced by environmental whistleblowers).
197.
See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, §
3352, 103 Stat. 16 (codifying various protections for whistleblowers from
retaliation).
198.
See id.; see also Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 110, 126 Stat. 1465 (lowering the burden of proof
from the WPA of 1989).
199.
See Public Employees for Environmental Responsibilty
(PEER), supra, note 152
200.
See Condit, supra, note 95 at 42 (discussing the statutory
limitation).
201.
See id. at 54–55 (discussing who bears the burden of proof and
what the standard is).
202.
See id. at 54 (describing how a longer time limit would be
beneficial).
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statute of limitations. The original version of the WPEA, the
WPA of 1989, expanded the statute of limitations available to
federal employees to 180 days.203 This reform increased the
effectiveness of whistleblower laws in protecting federal
employees.204 There is no reason that federal employees should
have longer to file a complaint than industry employees, factory
workers, concerned scientists, reporters, or other environmental
whistleblowers. Indeed, federal workers are probably more likely
to know about available protections than industry workers or
state government representatives because agencies are required
by law to train their employees in their rights and remedies
under whistleblower protection laws.205 As such, federal
environmental statutes should be reformed to provide
environmental whistleblowers with at least 180 days to report
retaliation.

IV. Conclusion
Minnesota looks different thanks to Fardin Oliaei. PCF
contamination is being cleaned up from waste sites.206 Water
supplies are being filtered.207 The public is more aware of PCF
contamination and the risks it poses to Minnesota
communities.208 Oliaei’s actions protected public health and the
environment.209 Despite the positive changes she made, Oliaei
describes the lessons she learned from her experience by saying:
I had intended to make a positive example [for my
203.
See id. (noting the increase in the time limit for reporting of
the WPEA).
204.
See id. (discussing the influence of the burden of proof reform
of the WPA on other State and Federal regulations).
205.
See Blowing the Whistle, supra note 195, at 14 (2011)
(reporting the MSPB’s findings on the effectiveness of current whistleblower
protections).
206.
See Mosedale, supra, note 102 (reporting the results of a
whistleblower in Minnesota).
207.
See id. (highlighting the benefits of a successful whistleblower
in Minnesota).
208.
See id. (describing the result of a successful whistleblowing in
Minnesota).
209.
See id. (summarizing the outcome of a whistleblower’s actions
in Minnesota).
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kids and my community]. I wanted to stand up for
what was right. I wanted to use good science to
advance the mission of the MPCA: protecting the
public health and environment. Instead, I
failed . . . . I took my kids home away. I took their
security away . . . . With what happened to me, I set
a negative example for the next generation: if you
work in a state agency, keep your mouth shut. Stay
quiet because you are going to be destroyed.210
Her words suggest that she is much like other
whistleblowers, who would not blow the whistle again if they got
a “do over.” The reforms proposed in this paper seek to change
this bleak situation by providing environmental whistleblowers
with the proper incentives and protections to ensure that they
would act to protect public health and the environment again and
again. Such reforms would set a positive example for future
generations: wherever you work, feel free to speak up and speak
out because our legal regime will protect and reward you for your
bravery.

210.
See Interview with Fardin Oliaei, supra, note 126 (describing
the personal feelings of a whistleblower who had to face enormous
consequences).

